Czech Republic 2-1 Greece: Greece vulnerable down their left again
The starting line-ups
The Czech Republic had a very good first ten minutes, and that was enough to put themselves in a commanding position.
Both coaches made changes to their starting line-ups, moving their XI closer to the side that finished their opening matches. Michal Bilek started holding midfielder Tomas Hubschman, with Petr Jiracek on the left of midfield. At the back, Michael Kadlec moved into the middle from the left-back position he looked uncomfortable in against Russia, so David Limbersky came into the side at left-back.
Fernando Santos went with the forward trio that ended the 1-1 draw against Poland, so Giorgos Samaras started in the centre, with Dimitris Salpingidis on the right, and Kostas Fortounis deeper on the left. Santos was without both first-choice centre-backs, so Kyriakos Papadopoulos and Kostas Katsouranis played there, with Giorgos Fotakis starting in the centre of midfield.
This wasn’t a high quality match – the Czech Republic raced into a 2-0 lead and then sat back, preserving their lead, conserving their energy. Like in the first game, Greece improved after half-time, but were still disappointingly tame in the final third.
Czech shape
The main story from this game was how improved the Czech Republic were, having previously looked like one of the competition’s weakest sides. The presence of Hubschan gave the midfield stability and allowed Jaroslav Plasil more freedom to dictate play without having to worry about his defensive responsibilities.
But more important was the balance the Czechs had on the flanks. In the first game they started two similar players on the wings, Vaclav Pilar and Jan Rezek. They both made the same movement from opposite flanks, and the Czech build-up play was rather predictable.
The presence of Jiracek on the right flank made their passing much better – he drifted inside and became another playmaker between the lines to assist Tomas Rosicky, and allowed the Czech captain move deeper into midfield, away from Giannis Maniatis to help retain the ball (which, considering the Czechs went 1-0 up within three minutes, was a large part of their gameplan). But, importantly, Jiracek was also content to stay wider when needed, attempting to get in behind Jose Holebas, the Greek left-back.
Left-back problems
Holebas’ defensive weakness had been exposed in the first game by Poland – when Jakub Blaszczykowski and Lukasz Piszczek teamed up and created 2 v 1 situations against him, and also took advantage of Holebas’ intention to play high up the pitch. Part of the problem in that match was the fact Samaras was playing on the left wing for Greece (but basically as a second striker) attempting to do his defensive work but frequently switching off, and letting Piszczek past him.
Bilek obviously noted that problem at left-back, and the Czech Republic made the most of it. In theory, Greece should have been stronger on that side of the pitch, because Samaras was upfront and the young Fortounis was on the left, more willing to track back and help out. He wasn’t particularly good defensively either, however, and Greece’s shape without the ball was poor – the wide players were slow to get back into position.
1-0
Fortounis can’t be blamed for the first goal, however – he was too high up the pitch to help out. Holebas was also high up, and was slow to regain his position, though the Czech Republic’s pressing was the major reason for the goal. They put immediate pressure on the Greek defence, with Rosicky moving forward to join Milan Baros, and pressing 2 v 2 from the front.
In turn, Pilar closed down Vasilis Torosidis, with Limbersky following up behind. Torosidis miscontrolled, Limbersky intercepted, and the Czechs were on their way. Greece lost possession in their own half, with only three man behind the ball. Holebas couldn’t shut down the gap between himself and Papadopoulous, and Jiracek raced through and finished. Oddly, his run was probably more typical of the movement (the dropped) Rezek would make, but Jiracek showed his adaptability to play that role too. From then on, he focused more upon linking play.
2-0
But that didn’t signal the end of the Greek problems down that flank. Another key feature of the Czech approach was moving Theodor Gebre-Selassie high up, forcing Fortounis back. For the second goal, Rosicky and Jiracek had swapped positions, and Fortounis got drawn into closing down Rosicky on the wing – in turn, giving Gebre-Selassie a run on him, and Fortounis couldn’t make up the ground, so Gebre-Selassie crossed for Pilar. It was the quickest 2-0 lead in the history of the European Championships.
Pilar played his role very intelligently – with Jiracek moving inside from the opposite flank, Pilar stayed very wide on the touchline to stretch the play, increasing the active playing zone and making it harder for Greece to close down. He still made those direct runs in the channels towards goal, but didn’t move inside and help pass the ball, leaving that to the ball-playing midfielders.
The early two-goal lead meant the rest of the first half was very quiet. The Czech Republic were content to cool the tempo, while Greece had problems getting themselves back into the game. Their midfield was not geared to attack – Giannis Maniatis had previously been the player connecting the midfield and attack, but was now the deepest midfielder. Fotakis didn’t replicate that role adequately, while Fortounis continued to be pushed back by Gebre-Selassie. Meanwhile, the presence of Hubschman helped protect the defence.
Second half
The second half was basically a test of Santos’ ability to turn the game. He’d used his substitutes excellently in the opening match, but here was limited to two tactical substitutions, having been forced to replace his goalkeeper in the first half.
His half-time change was Gekas on for Fotakis. Samaras went to the left, Gekas played upfront, and Fortounis came inside into a central playmaking role, almost turning Greece into a 4-2-1-3. But Hubschman nullified his influence, and most of Greece’s play seemed to go through Samaras, who played an odd hold-up role on the left.
Santos realised Fortounis wasn’t having much of an influence on the game, so replaced him with Kostas Mitroglu, more of a centre-forward. He roughly played in Fortounis’ position, but naturally moved higher up the pitch and effectively became a second striker.
Greece had got back into the game following a terrible Petr Cech error, but after Mitroglu’s introduction they seemed to be overstaffed high up the pitch, with four forwards, and lacked players to carry the ball towards goal. Sotiris Ninis or Giannis Fetfatzidis would have been useful options, players able to take on opponents. Instead, Greece hit lots of crosses, often from very deep positions.
Bilek’s swaps didn’t change things significantly. The Czech defence often dropped too deep and the side had effectively given up trying to score a third, but they hung on for the win.
Conclusion
Both managers attempted to correct the mistakes they made for the first game. For Bilek, it went perfectly – there was more defensive presence in the midfield, and more balance on the wings.
Greece simply failed to defend the left-back zone adequately for the second game running. On paper, Fortounis offered more protection for Holebas – but on the pitch, Holebas played too high up, and Gebre-Selassie got the better of Fortounis.
Greece were incredibly poor and the manager has to take some blame. He failed to realize the LB problem, left his midfield and attack completely separate and didn’t utilize the young talent he had. He was unlucky with the injuries and suspensions at CB, but he failed to protect that partnership at all, playing very open in the first 20 minutes when they needed to stay deep and then try and hit long balls to the front three. Instead they allowed their defensive weaknesses to be exposed and then had no clear plan on getting back into the game, with no linking player in midfield and both wingers playing high up. Samaras was probably the best forward, but he rarely got help and ended up losing the second ball most of the time. Don’t know why Ninis wasn’t brought on in midfield and the “Greek Messi” should be given a run out in the next game, but is unlikely with this manager. The Greeks are now out, they would have to beat Russia, which would require a massive change around in the team, very unlikely. They could grab a point maybe and cost Russia top spot, but it would require a lot of concentration for a team that has probably lost its motivation now.
Czech Republic got the win with little work really. The Greeks were a shambles and created massive holes for the Czechs to exploit. Jiracek played the “Ramires wing” role very well, showing a lot of energy and direct running. Pilar on the other wide was a constant threat with his pace and movement. The side kept the ball well with Rosicky and Plasil and the RB had a great game getting forward throughout. But I have doubts whether they will play well against Poland. They will struggle against a much better defense and and still look vulnerable to counter attacks at the back. The big factor will be whether Poland have the energy after tonight.
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Czech
Fetfatzidis seems like another that should be a certain selection. If Greece really want to win against Russia they’ll have to do something proactive, and pinning back Zhirkov with a quick, exciting winger seems like a no brainer. I imagine that Salpingidis’s energy and direct runs can be effective on the left as well, and I can’t understand how one of Katsouranis or Karagounis isn’t dropped, as Karagounis especially seems to slow everything down in midfield and offers little in terms of mobility or positioning. Berezutsky and Ignashevich looked fairly robust in the air tonight, and if Greece hope to profit from set pieces to get out of qualifying they’ll be disappointed.
They might as well, their facing an early exit anyway. Why not actually try and win with some exciting pacy players on the wing playing off Samaras (who hasn’t been that bad, just not supported well) and Ninis used in midfield looking to support from deep. Their current strategy has been a big failure and they will obviously need to rebuild for the WC qualifiers, so they should give the younger players some tournament experience.
When Mitroglou was introduced Greece looked more like 4-2-4 shape.
excited for the czech v poland match…should be a very open, entertaining game
based on how the Czechs sat back today.. uh doubtful
What I can’t figure out is why Greece played like England for long stretches: Win possession and then thump the ball forward and hope your players get a head on it. I’d love to see a stat on this – it seemed to me that Greece lost just about every header that came about because of a long Greek pass. Bypassing the midfield only works when it’s not tantamount to giving up possession, 4-2-4 or no.
Gotta wonder what Santos’ intentions were here.
Given all his problems in defense, going with a very attacking 4-3-3 against what would with almost a 100% certainty be some 4-5-1 variant just doesn’t seem like a smart choice. Greece don’t have the technical quality and creativity to pin back even an uninspired opponent like the Czech Rep in their own half and while the two early goals came thanks to dreadful individual mistakes as much as tactical issues, Santos’ men were being overrun in midfield non stop pretty much the entire first half.
Good win for the Czechs, but, after watching the Poland-Russia game, I don’t see them going through.
As for Greece, well, Russia should terrorize them.
Terrible game, excellent analysis.
they played on 11/11/11 and it finished 1-1. Greece were more than competitive, having 3 goals disallowed (1 of them incorrectly). Check it out on Youtube. Greece are inconsistent but if they do click they can definitely beat the Russians
don’t bother, Alex. We get no respect. Granted we had a dreadful first 10 mins today, but don’t expect any respect. Not worth trying anymore, buddy.
Typo (2nd paragraph): it should be “with Petr Jiracek on the right of midfield.”
It’s amazing how Greece can be so inconsistent. This article touches upon the psychological reasons for that:
http://www.phantis.com/blogs/midfield-maestro/euro-2012-greece-jekyll-hyde-team
From a tactical perspective, Greece have an abundance of problems and they all stem from the team selection. Chalkias should be 6th to 7th choice goalkeeper (and I am not exaggerating here! He should be behind, in this order: Chiotis, Sifakis, Konstantopoulos, Karnezis, Eleftheropoulos, Kapinos, Chalkias. It is mind-boggling that Chalkias plays!). Furthermore Tzavellas, Zaradoukas and Spyropoulos should all be ahead of Holebas in the pecking order for the left back position. They were all used in qualifiers and were very solid, so why has the untested Holebas been thrown in at the deep end? Why mess with a back line that clearly worked? The biggest problem of all is the lack of energy in midfield though. Karagounis and Katsouranis are simply too old, and the latter too lazy. Whilst Samaras simply doesn’t offer enough from the left side. Fetfatzidis is the key man for Greece. With a player like him, and Ninis (but only if Ninis is central rather than out wide) the Greeks can have the creative spark they crave whilst having the luxury of sitting deep.
Horrendous mistakes by the central defenders in the opening minutes, but I honestly think the keeper was even worse. No reason why he couldn’t have saved both of those goals
I agree, he seemed extremely shaky. Was a positive for Greece when he went off “injured”.
The only positive for Greece was, I thought, Kyriakos Papadopoulos’ performance (though he probably was partly at fault for at least one of the goals they conceded). I thought he was really sold, especially in the second half, with some wonderfull tackles and interceptions, not to mention he won every signle aerila battle. On the other hand, the greek fullbacks have to be amongst the worst I have even seen playing at this level.
Chalk this horrid performance up to two things–improper squad selection/tactics/formation, and a lack of desire.
Holebas still seems to think he’s a midfielder, and when a fullback goes so far out of position as to be useless in his proper place, then it’s the coach’s fault for not spelling out his assignment clearly enough, or else getting it entirely wrong.
Chalkias’ selection as GK was another fatal error, even though the fault behind both goals came from Holebas and then Katsouranis, who was old enough to know better and clear it first-time.
We had a wrongly disallowed goal once again, but that is football. We either beat Russia and continue (something nobody wants except the opposition) or go home early.
Must say I feel really sorry for Holebas getting all this bad feedback.
I felt so good about his success story in Greece so far.
The story of José Holebas.
José was born in Germany to Greek/Uruguayan parents. He did show promise as a young player, but was not taken on by any professional academy.
When he was 17, he got his girlfriend pregnant, so young José gave up on his dream of becoming a professional footballer.
He stopped playing altogether and took up a job in a warehouse to support the kid.
After some time had passed by, he did start to play again eventually, but only as a hobby.
He was plucked from the 6th division by TSV 1860 Munichs scouts when he was already 21 – rather late – at this age 1860s academy players have been with them for often 7 years or more.
He played with 1860s second team for a while and got his chance with the first team in the 2nd Bundesliga when he was 23, and would be fielded as a left forward or striker.
When veteran Ewald Lienen became 1860s new coach, he got it into his head that José might make a good leftback.
It did not start off well – defensively José would often be caught out of position, particularly in his first matches.
But he was pretty good in going forward and Lienen stuck to him, despite fans and media at times baying for him to be benched.
It paid off. Holebas did improve defensively, while he remained dangerous in the attack.
By the end of the season he had adapted rather well to his new position and there was talk of 1st Bundesliga clubs being interested.
Talk which was laughed off by not too few 1860 supporters who would not forgive him for his early bad matches.
Ewald Lienen then got the job at Olympiakos and he took his favourite pupil Holebas along.
From then I was not able to follow his matches anymore, but I noted by the stats, which I followed, that he would regularly play for the Greek top team – even though Lienen had been dumped unceremoniously before the season had even begun and even though he was an absolute nobody compared to some of the big names at Olympiakos.
So it seemed that he adapted rather well here, too. Olympiakos became Champions and José was a mainstay of that team.
About half a year later people took note of his availability for Greece, due to him being half-Greek.
Seeing him start at the EUROs, José Holebas of all of 1860s former second team players, the young dad who had already put football behind him, the perceived weak spot who at times was jeered at 1860, put a sweet smile on my face.
But it was clear that he was still going to have his deficiancies in this position, that his strengths were in going forward, so I feel that his teammates should have covered for him a bit more.
Anyway I have always liked him when he played for 1860. He was prone for some grave mistakes, yeah, his first touch could be frustratingly clumsy in particular, but you saw how he always, always tried.
I hope he is not being made a scapegoat for Greece now and if so, I hope he will have the opportunities to reconcile himself.
It would not be the first time if he would prove his detractors wrong in the long run.
That is a lovely story, a fairy tale story even. But the truth remains that Greece have conceded 3 goals in their two games so far. The two main culprits are Holebas and Chalkias (for every single goal!). Greece haven’t played anywhere near to their ability and we won’t see their potential until Ninis is used centrally rather than out wide, and Fetfatzidis is introduced behind the front man. Chiotis, the best Greek keeper hasn’t even gone to the tournament but Sifakis is decent too. In fact, here’s an interesting stat. In Sifakis’ 12 caps for Greece they haven’t lost a single game (the Czech game doesn’t count because Greece had already conceded their 2 goals when he came on). The point is Greece haven’t clicked but while Ninis and Fetfatzidis are desperately needed to offer an offensive threat, at the back Holebas and Chalkias have contributed to their down fall. Tzavellas, Spyropoulos and Zaradoukas were the left backs during the qualifying campaign where Greece were solid. So why, after merely 4 caps, does Santos leave the latter two at home to bring Holebas? I really respect Holebas’ heart, but the fact of the matter is he is not good enough as a left back. If he was in the squad as a left sided midfielder I’d say fair enough, perhaps off the bench he can offer something. But he’s not a left back.