The final analysis, part four: second half changes on the flanks
As the game wore on, Arjen Robben took up even more advanced and central positions when Holland had the ball.
Indeed, the shot below sees Robben (green) about to race through for his one-on-one with Iker Casillas, and the Spain defence temporarily looks like a back three up against two strikers, with two man-markers and Gerard Pique (yellow) as the sweeper.
In fact, you could make a case that Holland were essentially playing a similar system to Dunga’s Brazil side, with a lopsided 4-2-3-1 / 4-3-1-2 – Dirk Kuyt shuttling between midfield and a wide forward role (a la Elano/Ramires/Alves), with Robben playing as a second striker (a la Robinho). A similar picture emerges below (where Eljero Elia had replaced Kuyt) for Robben’s second run on goal – note how central he is (yellow), and how far he is from the man who had been tracking him, Joan Capdevila (green).
Spain also changed the way their wingers were deployed, with the introduction of Jesus Navas for Pedro Rodriguez. Navas (blue) kept more natural width on the right-hand side.
The width coming from Navas (again in blue) meant that Andres Iniesta (pink) took up more central positions.
The introduction of Navas didn’t create any more attacking players for Spain, however. Holland were still reasonably comfortable when Spain’s build-up play was laboured, especially when Kuyt dropped in to take care of Navas, as in the example below, on the far side.
This meant that Holland were effectively able to double-mark Spain’s other three attacking players. David Villa (green) is being taken care of by the two centre-backs (blue), whilst Xavi and Iniesta are up against the other four Dutch defensive players (red). The other man just ahead of the ball, Sergio Ramos, is retreating to his right-back position.
Spain dealt well with the potential threat of Elia after he came on, by taking advantage of Giovanni van Bronckhorst’s tendency to stick closely to his man. Here, Jesus Navas (blue) makes a run away from goal, and is tracked by van Bronckhorst (green). In turn, Ramos (red) bombs on into the space created, meaning Elia (yellow) has to drop into left-back to take care of him. Spain’s switching of their right-sided players like this meant that Elia was in too deep a position to help launch attacks.
The game finally started to open up for Spain when they introduced Cesc Fabregas for Xabi Alonso. He and Xavi took it in turns to come short for the ball, whilst the other one stayed high up the pitch. As well as Fabregas’ driving runs both on and off the ball, it also meant Xavi got more time on the ball – here, he is in ten yards of space when he receives the pass, and Mark van Bommel (blue) was forced to come 15 yards higher up the pitch to close him down.
Great work, ZM. I know its silly to question Del Bosque’s selection policy after he just won the world cup, but I still maintain that had Spain played a more attack-minded midfielder (like Fabregas) instead of Alonso, they would have won their matches much more comfortably. As it is, although clearly the superior side, they came close to losing each time. And it’s not like the 2 holding midfielders made their defense airtight. If you give Robben two chances like the ones he had in the final, he is going to convert at least one more than half the time. And either one would have meant Spain lose despite their passing dominance.
I was calling for this ever since i saw the team sheet against against Switzerland, But i didn’t want Cesc in starting line.
Silva for Alonso, with Xavi playing deeper in Alonso position and Silva taking the flanks, freeing up Iniesta to midfield.
I have seen many comments esp. in England suggesting that Fabregas was better than Xavi & should be used as starter because of what he did in Final, all the while forgetting what ZM has demonstrated above, that Xavi AND Cesc both played a equal part part.
I think I would have started Navas instead of Silva because we obviously saw what Navas can do, and Pedro seems more lethal when he’s playing on the opposite wing. I do agree that Busquets-Xavi-Iniesta midfield would have worked wonders because they’ve been playing with each other for Barcelona and have great communication.
Maybe del Bosque meant to keep four midfielders, alas Iniesta on the wing on the formation card when in reality it was a diamond midfield.
It isn’t silly to question. I like the double pivot because it really does help the midfield keep possesion better and eliminates the need for the front three to come deep and receive the ball. Fab’s introduction would have done nothing to solve Spain’s problems. How would he have widened the field. Or penetrated the eight man walls in the final third?
Pedro/Silva or Navas for Torres was probably the right decision although I personally prefer Silva
Laddie,
It seems that your take is belied by the fact that Spain scored its lone goals against both Holland and Paraguay after Alonso was taken off and Fabregas brought on, and required a set piece to score on Germany (scored while 2 holding midfielders were still on the pitch). Further, Spain won the Euro starting only one holding midfielder. Xavi likes to come deep to get the ball, so that is not really a problem in the least. Another point, Barca plays with only one holding midfielder–Busquets himself, and without any real wings (neither Pedro nor Messi really sit wide). So its hard to see how this would have done “nothing” to solve Spain’s problems.
It’s one thing to cause problems in the 85th minute and another thing in the 10th minute when teams are still fresh and eager to press. He was an effective sub but I doubt he would be as good starting. You use two incidents but what if I went back to the Confed Cup and the loss against the USA. He started that game but his runs made no difference. Not saying that his presence was the reason for their loss but to use two incidents that are influenced by other things is wrong. Llorente and Navas came on in WC games too and made a huge difference as subs late in the game too. His introduction and impact as a sub doesn’t really say that much about his potential impact as a starter. His impact as a starter can only be determined by theoretical or tactical imaginings.
‘… help the midfield keep possesion …’
I was thinking about anonymous’s’s’s words, you have a point.
Alonso is used to keep possession and keep control, Fabregas is used for a more attacking style. So the sub Fabregas for Alonso is logical. Spain starts the game (their game) and keep possession in midfield. After 70 minutes, when the opponent gets nervous or starts attacking, Fabregas is a wonderful substitution.
Alonso is a great deep lying playmaker, but Fabregas is a more direct attacking threat.
It’s a difference to have a player like Alonso in a deep position, or to have a player who likes to come deep to get the ball (like Xavi or Fabregas).
a different style, not that Spain would be less great.
As I’ve argued here before, del Bosque did more for Spain than we give him credit for. We all knew that Spain had immense depth–del Bosque showed us how such depth is converted into practical advantage on the field.
From the get go, I think it is clear that del Bosque understood that all things being even, Spain would have a slight advantage over any team in the world–simply because it had more quality. Therefore, all things being equal, Spain was more likely to score first. As the game went on, their chances would only increase. The only danger was having an opponent score early and being forced to chase a lead. Therefore, Alonso was a logical choice. He is versatile but primarily defensive. Judicious with his tackles, disciplined and pragmatic. Additionally, he has a powerful shot which only supplements Spain’s offense.
His role is to weather the first 70-80 minutes, making sure that Spain’s defense is untouchable. In the last twenty minutes, the opponents’ defenses are tired and stretched, and the introduction of someone like Fabregas is utterly lethal. A similar line of thought is evident behind the Pedro/Navas substitution. Navas is fairly one-dimensional–he offers great pace and width, but his play is naive: it’s no surprise that Spain didn’t look anymore dangerous after he came on. The bigger issue is that, by that point, the midfield control that Pedro offered was no longer a necessity. Thus, while Navas didn’t provide a direct advantage, he did change Spain’s offensive range without sacrificing anything defensively.
When Fabregas came on, Spain’s play through the center became much more solid. Coupled with the threat of Torres’ pace (even if just illusory) and Navas’ width, the outcome was nearly inevitable. It’s no accident that the winning goal came from a counter-attack initiated by Navas, sustained by Torres and assisted by Fabregas–all three substitutes played a vital role. If we look at del Bosque’s substitutions in this game, we see him expanding the field of play with his changes–a dramatic move that stretched the Dutch defense to the breaking point. And, a stark contrast to the starting line-up, which favored solidity and defensive dominance over literal attacking threats.
And, I’m not even considering the knock-on effects: Xavi falling deeper into Alonso’s position; Ramos hanging further back or cutting in due to Navas’ assumption of his offensive duties; and, probably most critically, Iniesta tucking in to occupy the central space Xavi left him–the red card was a direct result of this.
In effect, Spain first made sure to control the midfield by stuffing it with quality, and when the time seemed right that midfield disentangled itself into an offensive monster. I don’t think that any of this was not in del Bosque’s mind, and should be duly credited to his subtle understanding of tactics, his team, and his players.
Exactly.
Fellas, by the way, I haven’t read anything but soccer stuff the last two months. Gotta give it a rest. Besides, only one month before the Prem league starts!!!!!
The thing one has to keep in mind when considering a more attack-minded Spanish lineup is the fact that Spain’s possession football is as much defensive as it is offensive. A more direct Spain (hopefully) getting off more shots may increase the chances of scoring, but it also would increase turnover of the ball, more attacks for the opponent, and a less tired opponent defense (and a more tired Spanish one). The question is finding the best balance for Spain’s possession tactics to work. Attack too directly, and you may give up much of the benefit in exchange for a few more shots on goal.
The best way to test a more direct Spanish attack would be in friendlies against strong defenses. Against average opponents, almost any Spanish lineup is going to find goals much earlier than it did in the trench warfare of this World Cup.
Brilliant analysis. It’s really hard to keep track of a lot of these things when you’re busy biting your nails during games like these, so I really appreciate the work that you guys do. : )
The problem for del bosque and spain was in DM. Spain had no DM’s so they naturalized senna to fill the roll for the euros, but he has been injured and couldn’t play in confed or world cup.
In the confed cup spain played with xabi alonso in DM position when he is not a DM, he is a deep lying playmaker with some defensive caparbilities, it didn’t work and so spain lost to the USA.
Del bosque fast-tracked busquets for the DM position which he is good at but inexperianced, would you place important defensive responsibilty on him alone in a world cup?.
Del bosque didn’t, he thought he needed help in the form of xabi sitting beside him for protection and this made spain more defensive.
The mistake of del bosque was playing xavi in the forward role, something he is uncomfortable in, and not playing cesc instead in his best role. this made spanish formation unbalanced.
In the future as busquets gets more experianced del bosque will probably play xavi/xabi in deeper role next to busquets and play cesc/iniesta in advanced role with two proper wide men and villa or torres up front, making spain play better.
Very True and a very good point. Especially b/c teams will start to figure out how to neutralize Xavi’s tendencies to always drop deep and NOT play in between the lines. This will keep teams guessing, and Cesc deserves it too, as I can only see him developing even more in the future. I see a Spain team of Xavi/Alonso and Busquets in Midfield, instead of Busquets, Xavi, AND Alonso…
I don’t see Spain playing Villa and Torres in central roles though, as it would hinder their possession-keeping style….
i said Villa OR Torres up front alone.
Shame he was injured through tournament, it limited spains options upfront. A fit torres would have been a better solo man up front at the start of the latter matches, when the games began tight and the opposition pressed spain, his phisicality is better.
My bad, read it wrong
A symmetrical, classical 4-2-3-1 requires two good offensive Full-Backs advancing simultaneously, to open the game allowing the wide midfielders to advance and creating a triangle allowing wide passing options. If one or two of your full-backs can’t advance, your team quickly becomes toothless, or starts to pile up players on midfield. With one of the wide midfielders advancing in a second stryker role on the weaker side, you get the natural width you need on attack, but you create an enourmous defensive and creative hole on this side.
Great website.
Do you think we will see more of these ‘one winger, one centre forward’ systems next season, after their success (Brazil, Spain and late on here the Netherlands, which came so close)? It seems that Man Utd and Liverpool (when playing Park Ji-Sung / Dirk Kuyt) have already played systems approaching it at times. Though different in execution (and much less succesful) I think you could argue England’s shape was similar, when Rooney dropped deep and Gerrard came inside.
Yes, yes, very excited about this. Will do an article over the summer on it.
I really see now why Elia couldn’t make the impact that VMarwijk intended him to make (pin back Ramos and create a wide outlet in the attack): VBronckhorst was too strictly man-marking and hence (as you said) Elia had to track back to defend. Therefore, Elia couldn’t attack as much b/c he had such a HUGE amount of ground to make up b/c he was playing so deep (compared to how high up the pitch Robben was). Credit Spain, and in particular Navas for his very intelligent movement and perception of the situation.
Thanks ZM for clarifying this, and everything else of course=D
and ofcourse we must mention another impact of Navas substitution. Indeed Spain became more wide in the attacking field and sometimes Mathijsen pulled out on the flanks to help Van Brockhorst in doubling up Navas, which in turn resulted in losing their cohesiveness in the centre of the defense. With De Jong dropped out, a huge space was created for Xavi/Cesc/Iniesta to exploit.
When you’re the team with the less quality in the final and you’re just 10 minutes away from the russian roulette of penalties, you’re not seeking for the goal that will end the match. In my opinion Kuyt and de Jong substitutions were totally wrong and desynchronized Holland in the axis.
I agree, if i were VMarkwijk i’d play for penalties… sadly but true. If you are a down to 10 and you subbed one DM (De Jong) for an AM (VdV) you got to play plan Z which is defend deep and wait til the clock runs out and do or die in the penalties.
Spain found lots of space in that final stretch.
Looking forward to a few Pre-Season Previews now ZM
Thanks for all the analysis, ZM. Your articles go a long way toward aiding in recognizing other aspects of the game as well. The light you shed is greatly appreciated.
I think an aspect of del Bosque’s tactics that has ended up between the lines, as it were, is the attacking skills of so many of the Spanish squad. While 4-2-3-1 had been used for the most part as a defensive platform by several nations, this really isn’t the case for Spain. Sure, it’s not as adventurous as 4-3-3 or 3-4-3, but then again it’s not as tactically obvious either.
For example, the use of two holding midfielders. They were for the most part Busquets and Xabi. Now, while Xabi leans defensively in nature his penchant for attack is well known as are his skills in that area. Even Busquets, the deeper of the two, has been known to push up into the attack at times. Of the eleven players who consistently played for Spain this World Cup, not one of them would look out of place taking the ball forward into the final third. All have done so with their own clubs (Puyol plays very well up the right wing and Pique would make a decent striker).
By having so many players comfortable in the attack creates a fair amount of havoc for the opposition when it comes to marking. It’s a variable in the game that the opposing team has to anticipate for, and that can be a drain on their cohesion. So, while Spain anchored their game through possession football, they also demonstrated a fluidity among their players in terms of attack and defense. And with that fluidity came a high technical level.
Plain and simple, Spain are a very hard team to beat.
It is a very conservative formation for Spain. Spain always tries to play positive football and they do it well with a conservative formation by being so technically sound and very protective of the ball.
Their problem with attack was often not getting enough men into the opposition penalty box when the ball went down the wings. Their attack looked better than the opposition but the worry of conceding was a nagging concern.
Thanks for your compliments.
I wondered why Elia was so ineffective when he came on. This has helped answer that question. Thanks
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