Teams of the Decade #14: Milan 2002-07
Milan will go down as one of the classic teams of the decade, if only for the players that wore the Rossoneri shirts. It featured a true modern legend in Paolo Maldini, as well as Costacurta, Stam, Cafu, Nesta, Serginho, Pirlo, Redondo, Seedorf, Gattuso, Boban, Kaka, Rui Costa, Leonardo, Rivaldo, Ronaldinho, Shevchenko, Ronaldo, Inzaghi, Crespo, Pato…in fact, more true world-class footballers than any club throughout the decade.
Reaching three Champions League finals in five years from 2003-07 was an incredible achievement, although Ancelotti’s time at Milan only brought one Scudetto in eight years, which is why it is relatively far down this list.
The wonderful thing about Milan’s side was that they were able to deploy so many creative players in the centre of midfield, and the key to this was Andrea Pirlo. Not enough attention is given to Pirlo’s remarkable change in position. At the turn of the century, he was held up as the next great trequartista, the new Roberto Baggio, and excelled for Italy’s under-21 side playing just behind the forwards, both creating and scoring goals. Unfortunately, Inter couldn’t find any room for him in their side, and they loaned him out to his first club, Brescia, in order to learn first-hand from Baggio, the master. Carlo Mazzone, however, completely reinvented Pirlo’s game, and deployed him in front of the back four, sitting and creating from deep – using his incredibly accurate long-range passes to great effect.
Milan saw glimpses of how good he could be in a deep role, and bought him from their city rivals for £12m. But his first season at Milan was unspectacular – they spent most of the campaign in 5th or 6th place, and with Carlo Ancelotti knowing he would lose his job if he didn’t qualify for the Champions League, now was not the time for tactical innovations. Pirlo’s creativity was overlooked in favour of the experience of Demitrio Albertini, the reliability of Massimo Ambrosini, or the energy of Massimo Donati, another young Italian central midfielder Milan had bought in 2001. With Fernando Redondo set to come back from injury in Pirlo’s position, his days at Milan looked numbered.
The departure of Albertini in the summer of 2002 coincided with the arrival of Pirlo’s former Inter teammate, Clarence Seedorf. With Manuel Rui Costa also a regular, Milan were playing with two playmakers high up the pitch, and the opposition’s central midfield were forced to play deep, and focus on remaining compact in front of their defence. With Gatusso providing enough energy for two holding midfield players, Pirlo was free to create in front of his own back four – and suddenly Milan had Rui Costa, Seedorf and Pirlo, three classic Number 10s, in the centre of midfield.
Milan won the Champions League that season, with a solid back four and two out-and-out strikers. A fairly standard 4-3-1-2 shape (above left), it was the tireless running of Seedorf and Gatusso that meant Milan’s ultra-central approach worked.
Some sides might have rested on their laurels having won the European Cup, but Milan went ahead and bought a young Brazilian named Kaka. And, with Pippo Inzaghi injured for much of the campaign, Milan went even further in their obsession with central playmakers, often playing Kaka, Rui Costa, Seedorf and Pirlo in central midfield, with Shevchenko upfront on his own (above right), scoring 24 league goals that season. Milan won the league by 11 points.
But whilst their midfield offered numerous points of attack, it was often exposed defensively. This happened twice in the Champions League, in two of the most incredible comebacks in the history of European competition. In 2004, Milan thrashed Deportivo 4-1 at home in the first leg of their quarter-final and appeared to be comfortable, only to suffer a humiliating 0-4 defeat at the Riazor. The infamous episode in the 2005 Champions League final further demonstrated Milan’s problem – they led 3-0 at the break and still fell apart and lost the tie.
These embarrassments convinced Ancelotti that he needed more bite in midfield, with Seedorf and Gattuso getting older, and not able to cover as much distance as previously. Therefore, another holding midfielder, in Massimo Ambrosini was inserted, with Seedorf pushing further forward and Kaka playing off a lone striker (left). The decreased threat from the centre of midfield was compensated with two attacking, pacey full-backs, meaning Milan offered the same level of attacking threat whilst remaining solid defensively, and they regained the European Cup in 2007.
Teams of the Decade #14: Milan 2002-07







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Hello Zonal Marking (for lack of any other name to call you by!)
THis is an excellent and timely analysis of that Milan side, who, as you pointed out had forged a unique way of playing.
The most pertinent point you make, and a subject that has baffled me for years whenever reading retrospectives of this decade, concerns Andrea Pirlo; how is it that the revolutionary re-positioning of this No.10 is not considered one of the great tactical innovations of recent times? Moreover, how come so few teams have bothered to copy this patent?
And further to the point, if Ancelotti’s humble admissions are to believed then it is to Pirlo himself and not Mazzone nor the current Chelsea boss to whom credit must be given for ‘inventing’ that position. A delicate No.10 as the team’s holding midfielder? Suicide, surely!
Of course, this is what distinguished Milan’s versions of the Christmas tree and diamond formations: with a playmaker (as opposed to a destroyer like Gattuso or even an organiser like Redondo) at its base, this enabled the No.10 ahead of the midfield to focus less on cerebral creativity and more on direct dribbling and attacking- i.e., it facilitated the high-octane game of Kaka, who was hardly a traditional playmaking trequartista. A quick word of praise too for the movement of the strikers Inzaghi and Schevchenko, whose tendency to pull wide into the channels between full-back and centre-back afforded greater space for Kaka’ to surge through the middle.
We normally tend to view diamond midfields, especially in their classical Argentine mould, as conducive to a slow patient build-up game in which many players weave their way toegether towards goal. With Milan, however, the more intricate exchanges of passing could be carried out deeper in midfield, thereby lulling the opposition into a false sense of security, before applying a sudden propulsion forward from Kaka and one of the two strikers. Whether on the counter-attack or during more luxurient passages of possession, this Milan had all sets of tools to penetrate your defence.
Cheers for the comments both, interesting to hear those quotes from Mazzone, Brain. It did seem strange at the time that Inter loaned him out to Brescia to get playing time, considering Brescia already had Roberto Baggio playing off the frontman. I wonder, did Mazzone specifically bring him to Brescia to play him in a deeper role, or did he formulate the idea having seen him in training?
Either way, Roberticus, I agree, it was perhaps the tactical innovation of the decade. It seems players who were ‘classic No 10s’ have tended to have to find a different position, and most have been used as a wide player. Considering Pirlo was so successful in that role it’s hard to understand why no-one has attempted to follow suit, but having said that, I can’t think of too many players I would consider switching in the same way. Perhaps it was just a one-off that would be hard to replicate with other players?
At the time when Joe Cole was struggling to find form or a position, I wondered if he’d suit this role – but I can’t think of too many others.
Sorry to get involved in a discussion so late but I was recently reading some suggestions that France may play with Gourcuff as a deep lying playmaker in their World Cup side. Having watched quite a bit of Gourcuff I think he would be an ideal in this position and perhaps even more effective than he currently is – maybe he will have a similar response to Pirlo: “I get the ball all the time”.
The guy from the Football Further blog wrote a piece, which is very pretty informative called “Tactics: Is Yoann Gourcuff the new Andrea Pirlo?”. If so maybe he will go back to Milan to replace him?
Ancelotti has also experimented with Deco at the base of the Chelsea midfield but as his range of passing is not on a level with Pirlo, and Chelsea play with two other ostensible attacking midfielders, his success in the position has been limited.
I think it’s a hard model to copy for several reasons.
1. Few players have the football intelligence and ability of Pirlo. Most playmakers are very attack oriented and are inclined to dribble, take on players, shoot. In a deep lying position one needs patience, the ability to read the game early and an all around game, a full package that is very rare in the modern game. Xavi and Scholes are the only two I can think of that would even fit into this discussion.
2. You need the right support system, just as important as the deep lying playmaker himself. Gattuso at his peak was playing like two players and while he was known for his robust and tenacious style, he was actually a quite capable footballer who was on the same wavelength as his team mates. Seedorf had plenty of experience to fit into just about any system and was one of the most versatile midfielders of his generation. Both complimented Pirlo’s role perfectly.
Mazzone in World Soccer Magazine Sep 2008: “I was managing Brescia when Pirlo still considered himself a mezzapunta (attacking midfielder). I told him to play in front of the defenders, because he had vision. ‘But I like goals,’ he told me, unconvinced. ‘You score four or five a year,’ I replied. ‘Play in this position and you’ll score even more. Let’s try it for two weeks. You’ll be a base playmaker.’
“I told him to play two games without asking questions. Afterwards e told me: ‘I feel very comfortable here. I get the ball all the time.’ He found out how it worked. If I’d told him I was going to play him as a libero ahead of the defenders, he’d have run away terriffied. Calling him a base playmaker convinced him.”
I stand corrected, Brain
So the honour goes to Carlo Mazzone for the tactical innovation of the decade!
“how is it that the revolutionary re-positioning of this No.10 is not considered one of the great tactical innovations of recent times? Moreover, how come so few teams have bothered to copy this patent?”
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Good question.
Paul Scholes (though never really a no.10, he did start as a forward and then become an attacking midfield player) often plays a similarly deep-lying role for Manchester United, nowadays. Though in the continued absence of Hargreaves, they lack a Gattuso-type destroyer so tend to use the more positionally-aware Carrick in his place when it comes to the big games.
Chelsea have ocassionally used Ballack at the base of their diamond, as well.
(Great site, by the way)
Rob – I think that Fletcher is Man Utd’s “Gattuso”
I agree with all the comments above and I am always baffled that more teams don’t use a deep-laying playmaker, tactically it makes a lot of sense – often the deepest midfielder plays the most passes so surely having a player who is comfortable and creative in this role would be beneficial. I can only guess the reason it isn’t more common is to facilitate this tactic, you need your midfielders to do a tremendous amount of work and there arent actually that many gattuso’s around(players who scurry around incessantly but also have the technique and tactical understand to play at the top level).
I really liked this Milan side, I would have liked it higher up the list – tactical innovation leading the great success.
I would argue that the system bears at least a passing similarity to American Football. What Pirlo effectively became was the quarterback. He had players in front of him who would do the running and the physical work to allow him the space and time to pick his pass and find his team mates. Gattuso and Seedorf were the keys in allowing this to work, their versatility and efforts kept the ball in Milan’s possession and the opposition’s midfield constantly on the move.